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Emily Jackson*

Legalizing Assisted Dying: Cross Purposes
and Unintended Consequences

In the UK, assisted dying continues to be unlawful, and pro-legalization
campaigners have made use of human rights based applications for judicial
review and Private Members Bills in order to try to change the law. Interestingly,
however, the proposed statute would not offer an assisted death to many of
the litigants who have sought to force Parliament's hand. This article considers
whether this a one-off peculiarity, or whether there might be other mismatches
between what the law can achieve and what matters most to people who are
seeking an assisted death for themselves. It also explores what seems to be a
common feature of debates over assisted dying, namely the tendency for one
problem to be solved, while another is created.
Au Royaume-Uni, la mort assistee demeure illegale et les militants en faveur de
sa legalisation ont eu recours a des demandes de revision judiciairefondees sur
les droits de I'homme et a des projets de loi dinitiative parlementaire pour tenter
de modifier la Ioi. IIest toutefois interessant de noter que la loi proposee n'offrirait
pas une mort assistee a bon nombre des plaideurs qui ont tente de forcer la main
au Parlement. Cet article examine si cette particularite est unique ou s'il peut y
avoir d'autres inadequations entre ce que la loi peut accomplir et ce qui compte
le plus pour les personnes qui cherchent a obtenir une mort assistee pour ellesm~mes. II explore egalement ce qui semble 6tre une caracteristique commune
des debats sur la mort assistee, a savoir la tendance a resoudre un probleme et
a en creer un autre.
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Introduction
Over the past few decades, there has been a steady increase in the number of
countries and states in which assisted suicide and/or euthanasia have been
decriminalized. This has usually involved legislative change,1 but there
have been examples of judicial "law-making." For example in Montana,
the Netherlands and Canada, court judgments laid the foundations for
2
statutory reform.
In the UK, assisted suicide and euthanasia continue to be illegal, but
there has been significant activity, in the courts and in parliament, directed
towards a change in the law. Since Dianne Pretty's unsuccessful attempt
to secure immunity from prosecution for her husband in 2002, the courts
have moved some considerable distance towards acknowledging that the
blanket ban on assisted suicide at the very least engages, and perhaps also
has the potential to interfere with, claimants' human rights. At the same
time, an assisted dying bill, with slight modifications, has been debated in
parliament several times without progressing further, and in 2015, it was
defeated decisively in the House of Commons.
While the judicial review claims pursued by Debbie Purdy and Tony
Nicklinson, and most recently by Noel Conway and Omid T, were intended

1.
For example, Death with Dignity Act 1994, ORS § 127.800-.995 (Oregon); Loi relative a
/'euthanasie (Act ConcerningEuthanasia),28 May 2002 Moniteur Belge, 22 June 2002, 28515; Death
with DignityAct 2008 2008 RCW § 70.245 (Washington); Patient Choice and Controlat End of Life
Act 2013 2013, 18 VSA § 113 (Vermont); Voluntary Assisted Dying Act 2017 No 61, s 93 (Victoria,

Australia).
2.
Montana v Baxter, 354 Mont 234 (SC 2009); District Court of Leeuwarden, 21 February 1973,
NederlandseJurisprudentie,1973 No 183; CartervCanada, 2015 SCCS, [2015] 1 SCR 331.
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to pursue their rights as individuals, they were also directed towards
changing the law in order to benefit others in the future. By the time Tony
Nicklinson's case reached the Court of Appeal, he had died, and his widow
continued his case after his death in order that others would have an option
that had been unavailable to her late husband. Some litigants have even
been supported formally by the campaigning organisation Dignity in
Dying.
What is, however, peculiar about this twin track strategy of litigation
and parliamentary reform is that the draft bill, if passed, would not give
the option of an assisted death to many of those who have sought to
force parliament's hand by seeking a declaration of incompatibility in
the courts. Not only is it noteworthy that the draft Bill would specifically
exclude those individuals whose cases have been considered especially
compelling, but also the practical result would be that even if parliament
were to change its mind and pass the assisted dying bill in its current form,
litigation challenging its eligibility criteria would be likely to continue.
There is then something interesting about the way in which the
litigation and statutory reform agendas of those pursuing legalization
in the UK have been talking past each other. Of course, there may be
reasons for this specific to the UK, and I explore those in more detail
in the next section. But it is also worth considering whether this might
not just be a jurisdiction-specific oddity, but a feature more generally of
debates about the legalization of assisted dying. Are there contradictions
or inconsistencies in other jurisdictions' pursuit of legalized assisted
dying? Do the eligibility criteria for assisted dying always dovetail neatly
with the reasons why people seek assisted dying, or are there commonly
discrepancies between the two?
My purpose in this paper is not to advocate a particular model of law
reform. Instead I want to highlight several ways in which there may be a
mismatch between what law can achieve and what matters to those people
who might want an assisted death for themselves, now or in the future.
I also want to explore what seems to be a common feature of debates
over assisted dying, namely the tendency for one problem to be solved,
while another is created. Although I start with the curious and presumably
unsustainable status quo in the UK, I also draw on evidence from Western
European countries which have legalized assisted dying.3
3. No countries in Eastern Europe have legalized assisted dying, and indeed there appears to be
an East-West split within Europe. See further Ezekiel J Emanuel et al, "Attitudes and Practices of
Euthanasia and Physician-Assisted Suicide in the United States, Canada, and Europe" (2016) 316:1
JAMA 79; Joachim Cohen et al, "Public Acceptance of Euthanasia in Europe: a Survey Study in 47
countries" (2014) 59:1 Intl J Public Health 143.
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I. Law reform in the UK
This section will begin with a brief and necessarily incomplete history
of litigation directed towards a change in the law in the UK, starting
with Dianne Pretty's case in 2002. I will set out the shifts not only in the
outcomes of these cases, but also in the terms in which the judges discuss
the interests of those who wish to have the option of an assisted death, and
the prospect of legalization. Next I will provide a brief history of the failed
assisted dying bills, and their eligibility criteria, which would specifically
exclude those individuals towards whom there has been considerable
judicial sympathy.
1. From Pretty to Conway, via Purdy and Nicklinson
It was unsurprising that the courts rejected Dianne Pretty's application
for judicial review of the Director of Public Prosecutions' refusal to grant
her husband prospective immunity from prosecution if he were to help
her to commit suicide.' More noteworthy, given subsequent Strasbourg
jurisprudence,5 was the House of Lords' unanimous view that Mrs Pretty's
desire to end her life, in order to bring to an end her suffering from motor
neurone disease, did not engage any of her human rights. When Mrs Pretty
took her case to the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), it was
prepared to admit that Mrs Pretty's Article 8 rights were engaged,6 but it
nevertheless rejected Mrs Pretty's claim on the grounds that a complete
prohibition of assisted suicide was not a disproportionate response to the
state's concern to protect vulnerable members of society.'
Six years later, Debbie Purdy mounted a more modest claim against
the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP). Ms Purdy was also concerned
about the future prosecution of her husband, if he were to accompany her
to Dignitas in Switzerland. But, rather than seek an assurance that Omar
Puente would not be prosecuted if he were to do so, Ms Purdy instead
sought greater clarity as to the factors that the DPP would take into account

R (on the applicationofPretty)v DirectorofPublic Prosecutions,[2001] UKHL61, [2002] 1All
ER [Pretty]; see also Michael Freeman, "Denying Death its Dominion: Thoughts on the Dianne Pretty
4.

Case" (2002) 10:3 Medical L Rev 245.
5.
See, for example, Haas v Switzerland (2011), 53 EHRR 33.

6.

Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights provides that:
1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his
correspondence.
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except
such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of
national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of
disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and
freedoms of others.

7.

Pretty, supra note 4.
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when deciding whether to prosecute him. Although the lower courts were
bound by the House of Lords' decision in Pretty, that none of Ms Purdy's
human rights were engaged, the House of Lords disagreed. In R (on the
8
application of Purdy) v Director of Public Prosecutions,
it decided that
Ms Purdy's Article 8 rights had been breached by the DPP's failure to
set out in advance "a custom-built policy statement indicating the various
factors for and against prosecution."9
The House of Lords' sympathy and concern for Ms Purdy's
predicament was striking, especially since she was challenging guidance
that was intended not to help individuals decide whether to break the
law, but rather to assist prosecutors in the exercise of their discretion.
As Kate Greasley has pointed out, as "an instrument designed to give
prosecutors some direction in the exercise of their discretion, ...there is
accordingly no reason to think it subject to the same standards of precision
and clarity as criminal law defences." 1 In addition, even if the Code for
Crown Prosecutors might look vague to Ms Purdy, there had, in fact,
been consistency in the practice of non-prosecution by the DPP. Hence it
would be impossible to argue that citizens had been adversely affected by
capricious and inconsistent decision-making as a result of the failure to
provide "custom built" guidance to prosecutors.
Despite the fact that Ms Purdy was not the target audience of the
Code, Lord Neuberger was of the view that "a sensible and clear policy
document" might offer "some moral and emotional comfort, to Ms Purdy
and others in a similar tragic situation."" And Lord Brown described a
hypothetical scenario in which helping "a loved one, in desperate and
deteriorating circumstances" to end their life might be commended as
altruistic. 2 This clear expression of sympathy for Ms Purdy's plight
did not appear to be confined to the narrow question of the precision, or
otherwise, of the Code for Crown Prosecutors, rather it appeared to go
to the much broader question of whether, in certain circumstances, there
should be exceptions to the blanket ban on assisted suicide.
Five years later, Tony Nicklinson's judicial review action, pursued
after his death by his widow Jane, and joined with that of Paul Lamb,
reached the Supreme Court. Tony Nicklinson and Paul Lamb sought to
challenge directly the compatibility of the prohibition of assisted suicide

8.
[2009] UKHL 45, [2009] 4 All ER 1147.
9.
Per Lord Brown, ibid at para 86.
10. Kate Greasley, "R(Purdy) v DPP and the Casefor Wilful Blindness" (2010) 30:2 Oxford J Leg
Stud 301.
11. Purdy, supra note 8 at para 101.
12. Ibid at para 83.
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in section 2(1) of the Suicide Act 1961, and in particular its failure to
provide for any exceptions, with their Article 8 rights. In R (icklinson
andAnother) vMinistry ofJustice,13 their action failed. But although there
was a clear majority in the Supreme Court against issuing a declaration of
incompatibility, a majority suggested that the courts might be prepared to
intervene in the future.
Two justices were in favour of making a declaration of incompatibility
immediately (Lady Hale and Lord Kerr), on the grounds that section 2(1)
"fails to admit of any exceptions."14 At the other end of the spectrum, two
justices (Lords Sumption and Hughes) were of the view that maintaining a
blanket ban on assisted suicide lay within the UK's margin of appreciation.15
Not only had Parliament decided that there should be no exceptions to
section 2(1) when it passed the Suicide Act in 1961, but it had also decided
to keep the blanket ban when an amendment was debated in 2009.
16
In between these two settled views, there were a range of positions.
Lords Neuberger and Wilson suggested that if Parliament failed
satisfactorily to address this issue, there was a real prospect that a further
application might be successful.1 " While Lord Mance was of the view
that "Parliament is certainly the preferable forum in which any decision
should be made,"18 he would "not rule out the future possibility of a
further application. 1 9 Lords Reed and Clarke largely shared the view of
Lords Sumption and Hughes that this was a matter for Parliament, but
Lord Clarke nevertheless agreed with Lord Neuberger that "If Parliament
chooses not to debate these issues, I would expect the court to intervene. 20
Two other features of the judgments are worth mentioning. First,
several of the justices went to considerable lengths to discuss how assisted
dying might be legalized. In Lord Neuberger's opinion, a system of prior
approval might provide more robust protection for the vulnerable than the
status quo. Lady Hale discussed what sort of eligibility criteria might
be appropriate if assisted suicide were to be legalized, 21 and Lord Wilson
went so far as to set out the 18 factors which a High Court judge might
take into account in order to be "satisfied that a person's wish to commit

13.

[2014] UKSC 38, [2014] 3 AllER 843.

14.
15.

Per Lady Hale, ibid at para 301.
See, for example, Lord Sumption, ibid at para 218.

16.

R (on the application of Conway) v Secretary of Statefor Justice, [2017] EWHC 640 Admin at

para 9 (Burnett LJ).
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

Nicklinson, supra note 13 at paras 118 and 202.
Ibid at para 190.
Ibid.
Ibid at para 293.
Ibid at paras 314 and 205, respectively.
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suicide was ... voluntary, clear, settled and informed."" These discussions
about how assisted suicide might be legalized, and the potential benefits of
legalization were, needless to say, hypothetical, but it is hard to avoid the
conclusion that there is some sympathy among a significant minority of
the justices of the Supreme Court for the proposition that a system to allow
assisted suicide for people in Tony Nicklinson's situation, while providing
safeguards to protect the vulnerable, should not be "beyond the wit of a
legal system."23

Secondly, while the Supreme Court judgments set out the familiar
arguments as to why the question of legalization should be for the
democratically elected legislature, considering the issue in the round,
rather than for unelected judges, concerned only to decide an individual's
claim, Lord Neuberger's judgment contained an interesting and insightful
twist on this point:
there is force in the point that difficult or unpopular decisions which
need to be taken, are on some occasions more easily grasped by judges
than by the legislature. Although judges are not directly accountable
to the electorate, there are occasions when their relative freedom from
pressures of the moment enables them to take a more detached view.24
In acknowledging that emotive issues like assisted dying might be more
difficult for MPs, concerned about re-election, than they are for judges,
Lord Neuberger offers an explanation for the apparently puzzling
divergence between overwhelming public support for the legalization
of assisted dying and the decisive majority against legalization in the
most recent vote in the House of Commons. MPs concerned about their
parliamentary majorities are aware that campaigners against legalization
are well-organized and well-resourced, as Evan Harris found out when he
was traduced as "doctor death" in the tabloid press and by his evangelical
Conservative opponent."
Jonathan Herring has identified a further reason why the courts may
be better equipped than the legislature to find a solution to the problem of
assisted dying. Devising a generalized response, that could anticipate and
accommodate all of the difficult scenarios which might arise in the future
may be more challenging than exercising compassion in an individual
22.
23.
24.

Ibid at para 205.
Per Lady Hale, ibid at para 314.
Ibidatpara 101.

25. See, for example, Leo McKinstry, "Meet Dr Death, the Lib Dem MP Evan Harris who backs
embryo experiments, euthanasia and freer abortions," Daily Mail (31 October 2007), online:
<www.dailymail.co.uk/article-490815/Meet-Dc-Death-Lib-Dem-MP-Evan-Harris-backs-embryoexperiments-euthanasia-freer-abortions.html>
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case.26 As Herring explains, by "permitting an exceptional use of necessity,
the courts would not be legislating, but acknowledging that in a particular
case the criminal law should not apply."2 According to Herring, this would
certainly not be an isolated instance of the criminal law finding a way to
ensure that a general rule is not, in fact, applied where to do so would
produce "an unacceptable result."28
In the most recent English case, R (Conway) v Secretary of State for
Justice,29 Noel Conway, who has motor neurone disease and is terminally
ill, argued once again that the blanket ban in section 2 was incompatible
with his Article 8 rights. He also proposed "an alternative statutory
scheme" which would "sufficiently protect the weak and vulnerable" and,
as a result, "demonstrate that the blanket prohibition in section 2(1) is
an unnecessary and disproportionate interference with his Article 8(1)
rights."3 The Divisional Court had briskly rejected his claim, citing "a
rational between the prohibition in section 2 and the protection of the weak
and vulnerable."3 1 On appeal, the Court of Appeal rejected the argument
that the court was better placed than Parliament to "to form a view about
the adequacy of Mr Conway's proposed scheme,13 2 asserting instead that:
There can be no doubt that Parliament is a far better body for detennining
the difficult policy issue in relation to assisted suicide in view of the
conflicting, and highly contested, views within our society on the ethical
and moral issues and the risks and potential consequences of a change
in the law and the implementation of a scheme such as that proposed by
Mr Conway.33
At the time of writing, it is not known whether Mr Conway will be granted
permission to appeal to the Supreme Court. And in the case of Omid T, a
54 year old man suffering from multiple system atrophy, whose claim is
similarly that the blanket ban breaches his Article 8 rights, judgment is
pending following his first hearing in the High Court.
2. The assisted dying bills
Over roughly the same 15 year period from Dianne Pretty's case to those
of Noel Conway and Omid T, there have been multiple unsuccessful
26. Jonathan Herring, "Escaping the Shackles of Law at the End of Life: R(Nicklinson) v Ministry of
Justice" (2013) 21 Med L Rev 487.
27. Ibid.
28. Ibid.
29. [2018] EWCACiv 1431, [2018] WLR 925 [Conway].
30. Ibidatpara 51.
31. [2017] EWHC 2447 (Admin) at para 96, [2017] Med LR 507.
32. Supra note 29 at para 85.
33. Ibidat para 186.

Legalizing Assisted Dying: Cross Purposes and
Unintended Consequences

67

attempts in parliament to legalize assisted dying. In 2003, the House of
Lords voted against Lord Joffe's first Assisted Dying for the Terminally
Ill Bill. If passed, this would have enabled competent adult patients, who
were terminally ill and experiencing unbearable suffering, to request either
euthanasia or assisted suicide.
Following a further unsuccessful attempt to introduce it, Lord Joffe's
Bill was scrutinized by the House of Lords Select Committee on Assisted
Dying, which found that there had been several important developments
since the previous Select Committee report on assisted dying in the early
1990s, in particular that legislation had been enacted in the Netherlands
and in Oregon.34 The Select Committee had found the evidence from
Oregon particularly striking, and recommended that any new Bill should
distinguish between euthanasia and assisted suicide, in order that they
could be debated separately. It also recommended that consideration
should be given to a requirement for psychiatric assessment of applicants.
In 2012, the Commission on Assisted Dying, which had been chaired
by Lord Falconer, published a report that concluded that the current
legal status of assisted suicide was inadequate and incoherent.35 With
one dissenting voice, the commission was of the view that it would
be possible to devise a legal framework to protect vulnerable people.
Because it had received funding and support from organisations which
support legalization, questions were raised about the commission's
independence.36 The commission's report led to the first version of the
most recent Assisted Dying Bill, which would legalize only assisted
suicide. This was introduced into the House of Lords by Lord Falconer
in 2014, but its progress was halted by the 2015 general election. It was
then reintroduced into the Commons by Rob Marris MP in 2015, and after
a long debate, the Bill was rejected by 330 votes to 116.17 In 2016, Lord
Hayward introduced an Assisted Dying Bill in the House of Lords, but
parliament was dissolved before it received its second reading.
There have been differences between the various Bills: for example,
the most recent version introduces a requirement for "the consent of the
High Court (Family Division)," in addition to declarations from two

34.

UK, House of Lords Assisted Dying for the Terminally Ill Committee, Assisted Dying for the

Terminally Ill Bill First Report, Session 2004-5 (London: The Stationary Office Ltd, 2005) [HL Bill].
35. Commission on Assisted Dying, The CurrentLegal Status ofAssisted Dying isInadequate and

Incoherent... (Demos: London, 2011).
36. See, for example, UK, Parliament, Early Day Motion 2030, "The British Medical Association
Motion on the Commission onAssisted Dying and the BBC," Primary Sponsor Jim Dobbin MP (4 July
2011).
37. UK, Hansard, Vol 599 No 42 (11 September 2015) [Marris].
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registered medical practitioners that the person's circumstances satisfy the
statutory criteria. The basic eligibility criteria have remained relatively
constant, however. They are that the person is normally resident in the
UK, and:
(a) is tenninally ill, and expected to die within six months, and
(b) has the capacity to make the decision to end their own life; and
(c) has a clear and settled intention to end their own life which has been
reached voluntarily, on an informed basis and without coercion or
duress.
The most puzzling of these restrictions is the first one. If the purpose of
legalizing assisted dying is the relief of suffering, then restricting access to
people who are expected to die within six months leaves those individuals
whose unbearable suffering is not likely to come to end soon suffering
for an indeterminately long period of time.38 The "terminal illness"
requirement is the only criterion directed towards the condition of the
patient, so it is curious that it does not specify that the person's suffering
must be unbearable and unrelievable, merely that they must be likely to die
soon. Applied literally then, a terminally ill patient who is not suffering, or
whose suffering could be alleviated, would be eligible under this criterion,
whereas another patient whose unbearable suffering cannot be relieved,
would not.
Doctors'predictions oflife expectancy are also notoriously unreliable,39
which makes "likely to die within six months" an inevitably imprecise and
haphazard criterion. And since the person who dies an assisted death as
a result of satisfying the "six months to live" criterion will die sooner
than this, there is no way to evaluate the accuracy of the diagnosis in the
individual case.
There is, I would suggest, only one plausible reason for making "death
within six months" a necessary condition for access to assisted dying,
namely political pragmatism.4" There is evidence that public support for
the legalization of assisted dying is greatest for those who are terminally

38. Jukka Varelius, "Active and Passive Physician-Assisted Dying and the Terminal Disease
Requirement" (2016) 30:9 Bioethics 663.

39.

Nicholas A Christakis et al, "Extent and determinants of error in doctors' prognoses in terminally

ill patients: A prospective cohort study" (2000) 320:7233 Brit Med J 469.

40.

See further Elizabeth Peel & Rosie Harding, "A right to 'dying well' with dementia? Capacity,

'choice' and relationality" (2015) 25:1 Feminism & Psychology 137.
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ill.41 It is,perhaps, noteworthy that the public appears sympathetic in the
abstractto assisted dying only if it is confined to the terminally ill, while
also being sympathetic in individual cases to assisted dying for people
like Debbie Purdy and Tony Nicklinson, who were not terminally ill when
their cases were reported. This suggests either that people may not have
been aware that Debbie Purdy and Tony Nicklinson were not terminally
ill, or it may point to the wider problem highlighted by Jonathan Herring,
namely that devising a generalisable rule, capable of operating effectively
in all future cases, is significantly more challenging than identifying an
individual whose desire for an assisted death merits a compassionate
response.
It is also clear that the "terminal illness" requirement is used by prolegalization campaigners in order to counter the disability lobby's claim
that the Bill sends a message that their lives are not worth living. Pointing to
the terminal illness requirement, it is argued that there would be no danger
of a slippery slope, because disability and chronic illness are specifically
excluded. In addition, when death is hastened for someone who is already
at the end of her life, it might look as though less is lost by intervening
in the dying process.42 Those seeking reform might therefore reason that
any qualms parliamentarians have about patients dying earlier deaths as a
result of legalized assisted dying might be allayed in part because patients
would not be dying very much sooner, and legalization would therefore
not be making much difference in practice.
3. Explainingthe mismatch between litigation and the draft bill
It is, at first sight, peculiar that some of the individuals who have pursued
actions in the courts in order to try to bring the legalization of assisted dying
closer would not qualify for an assisted death under the draft legislation
pursued simultaneously in Parliament. One possible explanation is purely
practical. Litigation is time-consuming and there may be considerable

41. Elizabeth Clery, Sheila McLean & Miranda Phillips, "Quickening Death: The Euthanasia
Debate" in Alison Park et al, eds, British Social Attitudes: The 23rdReport (Sage: London, 2007);
Erwin Stolz et al, "Attitudes towards end-of-life decisions in case of long-term care dependency: a
survey among the older population in Austria" (2017) 43:6 J Medical Ethics 413; Maggie Hendry et
al, "Why do we want the right to die? A systematic review of the international literature on the views
of patients, carers and the public on assisted dying" (2012) 27:1 Palliative Medicine 13; Ruaidhri
McCormack, Margaret Clifford & Marian Conroy, "Attitudes of UK doctors towards euthanasia
and physician-assisted suicide: A systematic literature review" (2011) 26:1 Palliative Medicine 23
[McCormack]; Catherine S Shaffer, Alana N Cook & Deborah A Connolly, "A conceptual framework
for thinking about physician-assisted death for persons with a mental disorder" (2016) 22:2 Psychol
Pub Pol'y & L 141 [Shaffer].
42. Jukka Varelius, "Active and Passive Physician-Assisted Dying and the Terminal Disease
Requirement" (2016) 30:9 Bioethics 663-671.
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delays before appeals are heard.43 Until a case reaches the Supreme Court,
there is little chance of a fresh claim developing the law. If someone's
death is imminent, embarking on a series of hearings and appeals may not
be sensible or in her best interests. Individuals who are not likely to die
within the next few weeks or months are therefore better placed to pursue
potentially protracted litigation.
At the same time, Parliamentary opposition to assisted dying has been
fairly constant and emphatic, and those seeking to introduce reform may
understandably try to draw the exception to the ban on assisted suicide
as narrowly as possible. If a "terminal illness" requirement might help
to facilitate the passage of an assisted dying bill, it may be thought better
to include it, despite its incoherence and practical implications. It might
be simpler to contemplate the future amendment of an overly restrictive
assisted dying act, in order to accommodate the needs of patients in the
same predicament as Debbie Purdy or Tony Nicklinson, than to achieve an
initial Parliamentary majority for a more widely-drawn assisted dying bill.
There are dangers to approaching legalization in this way, however.
The terminal illness requirement might, as Samantha Halliday puts it, be
"merely a device intended to make the Bill appear more restrictive and
thus more palatable,"44 but if "robust safeguards" become "ritualized
practices of verification,"45 Halliday suggests that compliance "is reduced
to ticking items off a checklist." Indeed, there is evidence of this from
the Netherlands, where the question for the regional review committees
is not "did this patient die a good death?," but rather, "were the due care
criteria met?" 46 What legitimates an assisted death is not then the quality
of the patient's experience of the dying process, but the fulfilment of the
statutory eligibility criteria.47 Of course, if the statutory eligibility criteria
in fact embody the ingredients of a "good death," this may not matter. But
since "having six months left to life" is not a necessary feature of dying
well, ticking that box does not ensure that the patient died peacefully and
with dignity.

43. Delays as long as 19 months have been reported in the Court of Appeal. See further, Owen
Bowcott, "Cases taking 19 months to get to appeal court owing to backlogs," The Guardian (7
March 2016), online: <www.theguardian.com/law/2016/mar/07/court-cases-i 9-months-appeal-courtbacklogs>.
44. Samantha Halliday, "Comparative reflections upon the Assisted Dying Bill 2013: A plea for a
more European approach" (2013) 13:2 Medical L Intl 135.
45. Michael Power, The Audit Society: Rituals of erification (New York: Oxford University Press,
1999).
46. Ton Vink, "Self-Euthanasia, the Dutch Experience: In Search for the Meaning of a Good Death
or Eu Thanatos" (2016) 30:9 Bioethics 681 [Vink].
47. Ibid.
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4. Incoherence as a broader theme of legalizationdebates
While it might be possible to explain the inclusion of an illogical terminal
illness criterion, despite its foreseeable albeit unintended consequences, I
wantto suggestthatthis is not an isolated example ofpragmatically-tolerated
inconsistency. For example, the assisted dying bill's "contemporaneous
capacity" requirement might look uncontroversial, but it too might have
unintended and undesirable consequences. By ruling out advance requests
for assisted dying, to be carried out after a person has lost capacity, it
creates a dilemma for someone suffering from a degenerative condition,
which is likely to result in her losing capacity in the future. If a person
concerned about the death that lies ahead of her is also worried that she
will lose the option of assisted dying when she loses capacity, she might
seek an assisted death overseas, or commit suicide while she is still able
to do so. 48 The need for priorjudicial approval might have the same effect,
if people worry that by the time their condition becomes unbearable, they
might be too weak to face an application to the court, or that the court
49
process might take too long.
As a result, the capacity requirement, and perhaps also the need for the
approval of a High Court judge, might reproduce the problem that exists
now in the UK in relation to people who wish to have an assisted death at
Dignitas in Switzerland. The need to take advantage of Dignitas's services
while a person is still fit enough to travel abroad is likely to mean that she
dies sooner than she would have done if she could have been reassured
that a lawful assisted death would be available to her at home, once her
condition became unbearable. Indeed, it is likely that many of those who
have travelled to Dignitas would have died naturally, if they had known
that "a hypothetical exit plan" was available to them in the UK.5"
If the draft bill were to become law, it would provide the option of
assisted dying for some people, while at the same time placing fresh
obstacles in the way of other individuals whose suffering might be
unbearable, now or in the future, but who do not meet its restrictive
eligibility criteria.51 And this seems to be a recurrent theme in debates over
the legalization of assisted dying: one problem is solved, while another
48. See further the special edition of Feminism & Psychology (2015) volume 25 issue 1, in memory
of Sandra Bern, a psychologist who committed suicide four years after having been diagnosed with
Alzheimer's disease.
49. Penney Lewis, "Should Assisted Dying Require the Consent of a High Court Judge" (Paper
presented at Law Reform and End of Life Workshop, Halifax, Canada, September 2017).
50. Rinat Nissim, Lucia Gagliese & Gary Rodin, "The desire for hastened death in individuals with
advanced cancer: a longitudinal qualitative study" (2009) 69:2 Social Science & Medicine 165.
51. Samantha Halliday, "Comparative reflections upon the Assisted Dying Bill 2013: A plea for a
more European approach" (2013) 13 Medical L Intl 135.
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is created. For example, medicalizing assisted dying may help secure
legitimacy for it, while at the same time, giving doctors considerable
autonomy over the process may restrict patient choice. Medicalizing the
justifications for assisted dying may also fail to capture the real reasons
why some people find the dying process so frightening. Legalization is
often shaped by concern for the interests of vulnerable people, whereas all
of the evidence suggests that assisted dying is of interest to people who
are accustomed to being able to exercise considerable control over their
lives.52 Finally, formalizing the process of assisted dying, whether through
a ban, or through restrictions upon access, may mean that conversations
about wanting to hasten death are channelled through the relevant legal
framework, even though there are multiple reasons why people might
want to talk about a desire for death, only one of which is that they want
to seek an assisted death now. If the law related to assisted dying serves to
shut down conversations about dying, it may be actively working against
a key component of a good death.53
II. To medicalize or not medicalize assisteddying?
Most of the countries that have legalized assisted dying have made the
involvement of the medical profession mandatory, while individual
doctors' participation is optional. That is, doctors have to be involved to
confirm that the person who wishes to die meets the medicalized eligibility
criteria: for example, that the patient's condition is incurable; that her
suffering cannot be relieved; that she is not suffering from a psychiatric
disorder; and that her request is made voluntarily. The involvement of the
medical profession is also required in order to prescribe the fatal dose,
and in countries like Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg, where
euthanasia as well as assisted suicide is lawful, doctors are expected to
administer the drugs.
In the Netherlands, the Dutch Supreme Court decided in the
SutoriusIBrongersma case in 2002 that "a doctor who assists in suicide
in a case in which the patient's suffering is not predominantly due to
a 'medically classified disease or disorder,' but stems from the fact
that life has become meaningless for him, acts outside the scope of his
professional competence." 54 This case played a prominent role in debates
over legalization later the same year, with ministers stressing that non-

52.

See below, section 4.

53. General Medical Council, When a patient seeks advice or information about assistance to die
(London, UK: GMC, 2015) at paras 5 and 6 [GMC].
54. NederlandseJurisprudentie2003, no 167.
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medicalized suffering lay outside the scope of the legislation." In its
advice to doctors, the Royal Dutch Medical Association (KNMG) is clear
that unbearable suffering without a medical basis "falls outside the scope
of current Dutch legislation and is always a criminal offence."56
At the same time as mandating medical involvement, most countries
make it optional for individual doctors to participate by recognizing the
right of individual doctors conscientiously to object to participation in
assisted dying. Legalization then depends upon there being sufficient
members of the medical profession who do not conscientiously object
in order to fulfil the roles that only registered medical practitioners are
permitted to play.
There are clearly good reasons for involving doctors in the practice
of legalized assisted dying. First, and most obviously, doctors have the
necessary knowledge and skill to end lives quickly and painlessly. Unlike
suicide, which can be violent, brutal, and go badly wrong, a medicalized
assisted suicide can be achieved efficiently and effectively, or as John Paris
puts it "in an antiseptically acceptable fashion. 5 17 Many patients have the
option of bringing their life to an end, without medical involvement, by
stopping eating and drinking. Indeed, this is what Tony Nicklinson did
after the High Court had decided his case, with his death from pneumonia
following six days later. Voluntarily stopping eating and drinking (VSED)
can be a relatively peaceful way to die, especially in the presence of an
underlying condition, but it can also be torturous and challenging, for
the patient and her loved ones.58 Patients might additionally have the
wherewithal to end their own lives by overdosing on medicines which
they have been prescribed legitimately. Again, while this might lead to a
peaceful death, there are also dangers that the patient might misjudge the
dose, and be left worse off than she was before.59
Secondly, doctors are well placed to diagnose and confirm the existence
of clinical eligibility criteria, such as the presence of an incurable disease
55.

Suzanne Ost & Alexandra Mullock, "Pushing the boundaries of lawful assisted dying in the

Netherlands? Existential suffering and lay assistance" (2011) 18:2 Eur J Health L 163.
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58. Ranjani Varadarajan, Robert A Freeman & Jayesh R Parmar, "Aid-in-dying practice in Europe
and the United States: Legal and ethical perspectives for pharmacy" (2016) 12:6 Research in Social
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or the absence of treatable depression.6" Where the criteria for assisted
dying are medicalized, medical practitioners inevitably become their
gatekeepers. Thirdly, the experience of legalization in Belgium provides
powerful evidence that the integration of assisted dying and palliative care
can be beneficial for patients, ensuring continuity of care and a holistic
approach to patient suffering.61 There is certainly no evidence from
Belgium that access to high quality palliative care suffers when assisted
dying is also an option.62 Fourth, medicalising the process of assisted dying
serves a broader purpose of legitimation; that is, the medical profession
tends to be held in high regard, and so making the process a medical one
is likely to reassure individual patients, and the public more generally, that
rigorous safeguards will be applied.63
Certainly there is evidence that insofar as the public is in favour of the
legalization of assisted dying, this is dependent upon medical involvement,
and there would be hardly any support for the legalization of non-physician
assisted suicide.64 In her interviews with British patients seeking assisted
suicides in Switzerland, Naomi Richards found that a medicalized assisted
death matched their preference for a "good death": not only would it be
"orderly and controlled," and have a "guaranteed outcome," it would also
have "some social legitimacy because it involved a medical professional."65
Indeed, some of her interviewees valued physician involvement because
it offered professional validation of their suffering, and so "that the
responsibility for making the decision to die would be shared, making it
feel less like a suicide."66 Medicalization may also make an assisted death
easier for the relatives of the person who has died, whose ability to cope

60. Thomas P Duffy, "Physician Assistance in Dying: A Subtler Slippery Slope" (2014) 44:2
Hastings Center Report doi: 10.1002/hast.290.
61. Jan L Bernheim & Kasper Raus, "Euthanasia embedded in palliative care. Responses to
essentialistic criticisms of the Belgian model of integral end-of-life care" (2017) 43:8 J Medical
Ethics 489.
62. S Moreels et al, "Trends in palliative care at the end of life in Belgium, 2005-2014" (2016) 26:

Supplement 1 European J Public Health.
63. A parallel might be drawn with the medicalisation of abortion in the UK, which many have
argued has served to depoliticize the issue. See further Sally Sheldon, "The Abortion Act 1967: a
Critical Perspective" in Ellie Lee, ed, Abortion Law and Politics Today (Palgrave Macmillan 1998)
43 and Sheelagh McGuinness & Michael Thomson, "Medicine and abortion law: complicating the
reforming profession" (2015) 23 Medical L Rev 177.
64. Merel Kristi Schoonman et al, "Non-physician-assisted suicide in The Netherlands: a crosssectional survey among the general public" (2014) 40 Journal of Medical Ethics 842.
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might be "complicated by the feeling that society will disapprove of the

decision. "67
There are also powerful arguments againstthe medicalization of assisted
dying, however. First, there is considerable evidence that involvement in
assisted dying is not easy for doctors.68 Given that people enter the medical
profession in order to save and prolong lives, it is unsurprising that the
prospect of ending patients' lives might be experienced as difficult and
challenging. Opinion surveys consistently find that levels of support for
assisted dying are higher among the general public than they are among
medical practitioners,69 and a 2011 survey of Dutch doctors found that 86
7
per cent "dread" the "emotional burden of performing euthanasia."
Furthermore, there is evidence from the Netherlands and Belgium that
doctors find involvement in assisted dying more difficult when the patient's
reason for wanting to die is the result of either mental or psychosocial
suffering.71 Assisted dying in cases of mental disorder is lawful in both
Belgium and the Netherlands, but, while the numbers have increased in
recent years, 72 it continues to be comparatively rare. 73 It is, in practice,
difficult for doctors to determine whether the patient's mental suffering
is objectively intolerable, and physicians may be wary of relying upon
the patient's self-reporting. 74 While Dutch guidelines exist to help doctors
respond to requests in cases of psychiatric disorders, 75 Bolt et al found
that a minority of Dutch physicians thought it conceivable that they would
grant a euthanasia request in the case of a psychiatric disorder (34 per
cent) or early-stage dementia (40 per cent), compared with 85 per cent for
76
patients with cancer.
67.
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In the same study of Dutch physicians, and unsurprisingly given
its doubtful legality, 27 per cent thought it conceivable that they would
grant a request for someone who was simply "tired of life.177 In addition,
Kouwenhoven et al found that whether a doctor was willing to perform
euthanasia, as opposed to assisting someone's suicide, depended upon the
reason for the patient's request. Euthanasia was most common in cases
of cancer, but, as a result of its "psychological burden," doctors were
unwilling to carry out euthanasia in cases in which the patient's suffering
was harder to judge objectively, and had a preference in such cases for
78
assisted suicide, in which the patient takes responsibility for the final act.
Also difficult, from the perspective of the medical profession, are
advance requests for euthanasia.7 9 In the Netherlands, while a majority
of the public and the nursing profession support euthanasia in cases of
advanced dementia, this is true for only a minority of physicians.8" Ending
the life of a patient who is unable to say unambiguously that this is
definitely what she wants, on the grounds that she indicated some time
ago that this was the point at which she would wish her life to be ended,
is understandably challenging. 1 However carefully it was drafted, the
passage of time between the writing of an advance decision and putting it
into effect creates room for doubt at the moment when the lethal injection
is given as to whether this is still what the patient wants. 2
While advance decisions might be present in some assisted deaths in
the Netherlands and Belgium, in the vast majority of cases, the patient
has also been able to confirm her request orally. In the Netherlands, for
example, even when an advance decision for euthanasia (ADE) is present,
there is generally also a contemporaneous request from a competent
patient.8 3 Penney Lewis and Isra Black point out that there has been "at
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least one recent dementia case where an ADE was the effective request." 4
But given that the KNMG has advised Dutch doctors that they should not
perform euthanasia when they cannot communicate with the patient, such
cases will continue to be unusual. At first, the evidence that 2.1 per cent
of reported cases in Belgium were based upon an advance directive might
look rather different, but these are not cases of advanced dementia. Rather,
advance decisions for euthanasia in Belgium are possible only for patients
who have irreversibly lost consciousness. 5
Assisted dying may be most straightforward, from the point of view
of the medical profession, for patients in the final stages of cancer, when
a doctor can be confident in her diagnosis and prognosis, and when the
patient is able to confirm both that her suffering is unbearable and that
she wishes to die now. In both the Netherlands and in Belgium, although
the proportion has fallen in recent years, cancer continues to be the
most common reason for requests for euthanasia (68 per cent in both
jurisdictions).16 Interestingly, in Switzerland, where assisted suicide is
less medicalized, fewer than half (46 per cent) of those who die assisted
deaths were suffering from cancer.17 Steck et al found that in 16 per cent of
death certificates following assisted suicides in Switzerland, no underlying
cause of death was recorded, and that Exit Duetsche Schweiz and Dignitas
have reported that as many as 25 per cent "involved no fatal illness," with
"weariness of life" an increasingly common reason for choosing assisted
suicide. 8 In Gauthier et al's study of "suicide tourists" to Switzerland, 47
per cent were suffering from neurological disease, and only 37 per cent
from cancer.8 9
While patients with cancer make up a non-negligible proportion of
those who might want to seek an assisted death, the desire for assisted death
is certainly not limited to patients with cancer. And the reasons patients
commonly give for wishing to hasten their deaths are, unlike cancer,
84. Penney Lewis & Isra Black, "Adherence to the request criterion in jurisdictions where assisted
dying is lawful? A review of the criteria and evidence in the Netherlands, Belgium, Oregon, and
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Medical Ethics 611.
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difficult for doctors to diagnose and verify: namely, a loss of meaning,
a loss of connectedness, a loss of control, or the simple feeling that their
life is now "completed," and no longer worth living.9" Van Wijnjgaarden
et al's study of people who have developed a wish to die explain that this
is often a result of multiple losses, ranging from physical decline and its
associated loss of privacy, to the diminution of their social circle through
successive bereavements.91 Moreover, it is often fear of an intolerable
future, rather than intolerable present suffering, which prompts interest in
assisted dying.92 While doctors may be able to provide some reassurance
about the future management of pain, there is little that they can do to take
away people's fear of a loss of control over their bodies.
For many patients, the fear of physical decline and an unpleasant
death is not necessarily simply an abstract concern, resulting from fear of
the unknown. Rather, it is not uncommon for people's interest in hastening
their own death to be grounded in the experience of having watched a
close friend or relative suffer.93 People who live with recent and disturbing
images of a loved one's suffering are unsurprisingly sceptical about
reassurances that their future distress can be managed effectively.
Patients who are fearful about what lies ahead for them might find
the option of an advance decision for euthanasia reassuring,94 but this is
reassurance that few doctors in the Netherlands and Belgium are able to
provide, because their use in practice is so rare. If legalized assisted dying
depends upon the patient experiencing objectively unbearable suffering at
the time when the lethal injection is given, or if the reality is that doctors
are unwilling to perform euthanasia unless this is the case, it is impossible
to give patients the comfort of knowing that their wish not to continue
living once their life has lost meaning to them will be respected. As a
result, even in countries where assisted dying has been legalized, patients
face the unintended consequence that they may be prompted to "take
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matters into their own hands" while they still have the capacity to do so,

and hence die earlier deaths, and perhaps "give up what may be some good
years of life in order to ensure than one can die with dignity."95
In short, then, there may be a mismatch between the reasons why
some patients wish to end their lives prematurely and medicalized assisted
dying. As a result, while medicalized assisted dying in the Netherlands
and Belgium undoubtedly provides reassurance to some patients, there is
evidence that it does not help everyone. First, the number of patients in the
Netherlands who choose to end their lives through voluntarily stopping
eating and drinking (VSED) is much higher than one might expect.
Studies indicate that this is the primary cause of death in between 0.4 and
2.1 per cent of all deaths. Bolt et al found that nearly half (46 per cent)
of all primary care physicians "had cared for a patient who had hastened
death by VSED. 9 6 This seems odd in a country in which both euthanasia
and assisted suicide have been lawful for more than four decades. Bolt
et al found that about a fifth of those who had died following VSED had
previously requested an assisted death, but most had not. Some opted for
VSED in order not to have to rely upon their physician, and 77 per cent had
"existential" motives for hastening death. Most were older than patients
requesting an assisted death (median age 84), and a minority (27 per cent)
suffered from cancer.
Secondly, in recent years campaigners in the Netherlands have
attempted to assert greater autonomy over assisted dying through the
"Of Free Will" (Uit Vrije Wil) movement. Although it was ultimately
unsuccessful, in 2010 the "Of Free Will" movement managed to put before
the Dutch parliament a bill which would have enabled anyone over the age
of 70 to have access to assisted suicide, regardless of whether they had
any medical problems at all. Another development has been the setting
up of the End of Life Clinic (levenseindekliniek), whose 50 teams offer
the option of euthanasia for individuals whose requests have been turned
down by their treating physicians. Although the numbers are relatively
small, demand has increased significantly between 2013 and 2017, from
97
134 to more than 500 cases.
As Kathy Davis explains, euthanasia in the Netherlands "is not nearly
as common as one might imagine," and "is not at all easy to get."9 Doctors,
95. Davis, supra note 82.
96. Eva E Bolt et al, "Primary care patients hastening death by voluntarily stopping eating and
drinking" (2015) 13 Annals Family Medicine 421.
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Davis points out, turn down "two-thirds of the requests for euthanasia"
that they receive. 99 Assisted dying is not available as of right, but is a
matter of medical discretion. As Ton Vink points out, "the physician's
autonomy is decisive," not the patient's.1"' Indeed, the first cases which
carved out limited access to euthanasia in the Netherlands were grounded
in the fact that a doctor might be faced with two irreconcilable duties,"'
not that the patient might have a right to choose to bring her life to an end.
There is an obvious parallel here with the decriminalisation of abortion in
the UK through the Abortion Act 1967, which did not give women a right
to access abortion, even if their circumstances clearly satisfied what might
be described as the 1967 Act's version of "due care" criteria; rather what
matters is the doctors' opinion as to whether the woman's circumstances
satisfy one of the four statutory grounds for abortion.0 2
Thirdly, it appears that doctors in both the Netherlands and Belgium
are increasingly confronted with requests for assisted dying that do not fit
the standard medicalized model. The KNMG, for example, has reported
a growth in requests from people with "an accumulation of non-lifethreatening geriatric afflictions, including loss of physical function and
mental vitality, loneliness and loss of autonomy."0 3 Snijdewind et al's
interviews with physicians in the Netherlands found that the majority
believed that requests for EAS "where there was no medical condition
underlying the request," have become more frequent in recent years, and
most found these requests problematic:
Most physicians expressed the view that these requests based on nonmedical reasons stemmed from loneliness and that this was not a medical
problem but a societal one, not something for which EAS was the right
solution. Most physicians also mentioned not feeling competent to
make a decision about EAS in these cases where suffering was mostly
existential, not motivated by a medical condition; they felt it did not
belong to the domain of medical professionals." 4
It is possible that there are more requests for assisted dying in the absence
of a medical condition because people in the Netherlands and Belgium are
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more familiar with the availability of assisted dying.1"' It is also possible
that as the "baby-boomer" generation starts to face the multiple losses
associated with old age, it does so in a more assertive and demanding way
than previous generations.
Lawful assisted suicide in Switzerland is undoubtedly less medicalized
than it is in the Netherlands and Belgium. Since 1942, the criminal code has
prohibited selfishly-motivated assisted suicide. There is no requirement
that the assister must be a doctor," 6 nor does the request for assistance
have to be the result of a medical condition."'7 Doctors are seldom present
during assisted suicides, and the patient will normally be assisted instead
by a volunteer, acting on behalf of one of the "right to die" associations.
It is also very unusual for patients to receive assistance with suicide in a
hospital," 8 and assisted suicides generally take place in apartments rented
for the purpose by right to die associations.
In practice, however, there are a number of medical eligibility criteria
imposed defacto. For an individual's act to count as suicide, the individual
who seeks help must have "decisional capacity." More significantly,
because only medical practitioners can issue prescriptions for sodium
pentobarbital, doctors retain the ability to veto an assisted suicide. 0 9 For
the prescription of lethal medication to be within the limits of accepted
medical practice, courts have established that the doctor must personally
110
examine the individual.
As part of its medical-ethical guideline on end of life care, the
Swiss Academy of Medical Sciences (SAMS) has issued guidance to
its members on their involvement in assisted suicide. These guidelines,
first issued in 2004 and updated in 2013, express reservations about
doctors' participation in assisted suicides: "the task of the physician is to
alleviate symptoms and to support the patient. It is not his task to directly
offer assistance in suicide, he rather is obliged to alleviate any suffering
underlying the patient's wish to commit suicide.1 11 Nevertheless, the
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SAMS guidance also acknowledges that "consideration of the patient's
wishes is fundamental for the physician-patient relationship. This dilemma
requires a personal decision of conscience on the part of the physician.
The decision to provide assistance in suicide must be respected as such."
If a doctor does decide to assist a patient by issuing a prescription for
lethal medication, the SAMS guideline specifies that she should ensure
that a number of criteria are satisfied:
- The patient's disease justifies the assumption that he is approaching
the end of life.

- Alternative possibilities for providing assistance have been discussed
and, if desired, have been implemented.
- The patient is capable of making the decision, his wish has been well
thought out, without external pressure, and he persists in this wish.
This has been checked by a third person, who is not necessarily a
physician.
- The final action in the process leading to death must always be taken
by the patient himself."'
These guidelines do not have the force of law, but they are effectively
binding on registered medical practitioners, and since only doctors can
lawfully prescribe sodium pentobarbital, they are de facto binding on the
right to die associations as well.
Seven years ago, the Swiss government considered amending Article
115 of the Penal Code, but decided against it, in part because specific
measures might legitimize the right to die organisations, and would be
likely to face resistance from the medical profession.113 Just three years
later, in Gross v Switzerland,"4 the ECtHR, by a majority, found that 'the
absence of clear and comprehensive legal guidelines' violated the Article
8 rights of a 76-year-old woman who was not terminally ill, but who had
wanted to end her life for many years, because she was "becoming more
and more frail as time passes and is unwilling to continue suffering the
decline of her physical and mental faculties."1 5 A majority in the ECtHR
considered that this lack of clarity would be "likely to have a chilling
effect on doctors who would otherwise be inclined to provide someone
such as the applicant with the requested medical prescription, 1 1 16 and that
the Swiss failure to "provide sufficient guidelines ensuring clarity" as to
112. Ibid.

113. Grosse, supra note 101.
114. [2013] ECHR 429.
115. Ibid at para 7.
116. Ibid at para 65.
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the extent of the right to obtain a lethal dose of sodium pentobarbital on

medical prescription, violated Mrs Gross's Article 8 rights.11
In contrast, the three dissenting judges considered that "the applicant in
the instant case did not fulfil the conditions laid down in the medical ethics
guidelines on the care of patients at the end of life adopted by the Swiss
Academy of Medical Sciences which have, in our opinion, been correctly
applied and clearly interpreted in the jurisprudence of the Federal Supreme
Court." ' And although the majority specifically declined to express a view
as to what the substantive content of clearer Swiss guidelines should be,119
suggesting that a clearer but more restrictive regime might be compatible
with Alda Gross's human rights, Stephen Brown claims that the majority
judgment in Gross suggests that "the ECtHR has changed gears regarding
assisted suicide. 20
III. Vulnerable or not vulnerable?
The most commonly cited reason not to legalize assisted dying, or to
impose rigorous safeguards when doing so, is concern for the vulnerable.
Indeed, it seems so obvious as to barely need stating that people who are
dying are a potentially vulnerable group: all of them are ill, and many of
them will be elderly. The House of Lords Select Committee on Assisted
Dying, for example, was "concerned that vulnerable people-the elderly,
lonely, sick or distressed-would feel pressure, whether real or imagined,
to request early death. 1 2 In Purdy, Lord Neuberger explained that the
Code for prosecutors was "simply inadequate" for the unusual crime
created by section 2(1) because "it is the victim whose article 8 rights
are engaged, and he or she will almost always be unusually vulnerable
and sensitive. 122 In introducing the Assisted Dying Bill to the House of
Commons, Rob Marris MP said that "coercion of the vulnerable is the
most difficult issue, for me and many people in the House and outside. 23
Opponents of his Bill repeatedly mentioned concern for the vulnerable.
For example, Lyn Brown MP voted against the Bill on the grounds that it
might "fundamentally change the way that our society thinks about and
deals with the terminally ill, severely disabled people and the vulnerable,

117. Ibid at para 67.
118. Ibid at para 2.
119. Ibidatpara69.

120. Stephen Brown, "Gross v. Switzerland and Right to Die Jurisprudence in the European Court of
Human Rights" (2014) 14 Chicago-Kent J Intl L 5.
121. HL Bill, supra note 34 at para 239.
122. Ibid at para 102.
123. Marris, supra note 37 at col 661.
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'
troubled and elderly."124
In Nicklinson, Lady Hale suggested that protection
of the vulnerable was the only legitimate justification for section 2(1) of
the Suicide Act's interference with Tony Nicklinson's Article 8 rights:

The only legitimate aim which has been advanced for this interference
is the protection of vulnerable people, those who feel that their lives are
worthless or that they are a burden to others and therefore that they
ought
25
to end their own lives even though they do not really want to.
And in R v Conway, the Court of Appeal considered "that it is impossible
to say that the Divisional Court did not have material on which properly
to come to their conclusions on the inadequacy of the proposed scheme to
1 26
protect the weak and vulnerable.
But despite this apparent consensus that legalized assisted dying might
pose a threat to the vulnerable, and that this represents either a reason not
to legalize at all, or a reason to proceed with caution, the evidence that we
now have about patients who request legalized assisted dying suggests
that they have something in common other than their vulnerability. In the
Netherlands and Belgium, typical patients who request assisted death are
"older, white and well-educated.1 121 In Switzerland, they are more likely to
live alone, to have no religious affiliation, to be well-educated, and to live
128
in urban rather than rural areas and in more affluent neighbourhoods.
Systematic reviews of attitudes towards assisted dying have
consistently found support is strongest among the irreligious, 129 the middle
classes,13 ° and the "highly educated,1 . 1 and lowest among people with
strong religious or spiritual beliefs.1 2 Interest in assisted dying comes
133
from those patients who wish to exert control over the dying process.
As Raijmakers et al put it, "a shared theme seems to be that those who

124.
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Ibid at col 669.
Nicklinson, supra note 13 at para 311.
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clinician's view" (2012) 46 Australian & New Zealand J Psychiatry 936 [Macleod].
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support assistance in dying value control."1 34 They are "not prepared to
accept paternalistic attitudes on the part of health staff," and see access to
'
assisted dying "as a way of rising above one's circumstances."135
Smith
et al also found that requesters of assisted dying had what they describe
as "dismissive styles of attachment," that is they prioritize "self-reliance,
autonomy and independence," and are interested in assisted dying in
order to "maintain an ultimate sense of control and autonomy within a
'
process that allows very little opportunity for either."136
Predictably, these
differences are reproduced among those who are in favour of assisted
dying for older people who are "tired of life," whom Raijmakers et al
again found "were more likely than opponents to be highly educated, to be
non-religious, to have little trust in physicians, and to prefer to make their
1 37
own healthcare decisions."
Interest in assisted dying therefore appears to be associated with
patients who might be described as hyper-autonomous, who have become
accustomed to exercising choice and control over their lives and who wish
to continue to do so over their deaths. For such patients, an assisted death
1 38
represents "liberation from a situation that [is] perceived as an affront.
What is also significant about this growing body of evidence is that it is
the patient's beliefs, characteristics and priorities, rather than their illness
or symptoms, which are the principal predictor of the desire to access an
assisted death. Patients'interest in assisted dying stems not from objectively
inadequate symptom control, which might be alleviated through access to
better palliative care, but from their subjective perception of what makes
a good death. Smith et al explain that, for some patients, "the anticipated
dependency of terminal illness... may have been more unbearable than
the physical symptoms themselves. 1 39 According to al-Awamer, "these
are rational capable patients who are not depressed and who want to die
early based on their personal values and views of suffering and life. These
wishes are not driven by a failure of palliative care but by a desire to live
Ion their own terms.' ' 1 40

134. Ibid
135. Ibid

136. Smith, supra note 129.
137. Raijmakers, supra note 133.
138. Kathrin Ohnsorge, Heike Gudat & Christoph Rehmann-Sutter, "What a wish to die can mean:
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terminally ill cancer patients in palliative care" (2014) 13 BMC Palliative Care 38 [Ohnsorge].
139. Smith, supra note 129.
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Canadian Family Physician 1039.
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Opponents of assisted dying often argue that high quality palliative
care can eliminate the desire for assisted dying,141 but if it is the intrinsic
internal characteristics of the individual-her lack of spirituality and her
desire for control and independence-that drive the desire for an assisted
death, it is not clear that palliative care can, or should, be able to eliminate
these. In keeping with these findings, interviews with British patients
who have started the process of seeking an assisted death with Dignitas
in Switzerland have found that "getting the green light" from Dignitas
becomes "a different object towards which they could direct their hope."142
It became a goal to aim for, and "a hedging strategy for maximising
control."143
Needless to say, I do not mean to suggest that concern for the vulnerable
is entirely misplaced. On the contrary, it is clearly important that any law
which permits assisted dying contains a mechanism capable of weeding
out requests that are prompted not by someone's desire to die, but by
unscrupulous others exerting pressure upon them. My point is instead
that if assisted dying legislation is designed only to protect the vulnerable,
it will not do anything to address the needs of those whose desire for an
assisted death comes instead from this need for control.
If people could be reassured about their capacity to exercise control
in the future, perhaps through being able to execute a binding advance
decision for euthanasia, this might provide the comfort that these people
need in order to face the dying process without being overwhelmed by the
fear of what might lie ahead. In short, designing an assisted dying law to
prevent the abuse of the vulnerable misses the opportunity to address the
needs of the autonomous patient, who instead needs reassurance about her
future options to exert control and meaning over the process of dying.
IV. Talking about assisted dying as an end in itself
There are multiple reasons why someone might express an interest
in hastening death, only one of which is that they would like to access
an assisted death now.144 Some people engage in conversations about
seeking an early death as a way of asking for reassurance,145 or as a "cry

141. YY Mak, G Elwyn & IG Finlay, "Patients' voices are needed in debates on euthanasia" (2003)
327 British Medical Journal 213.
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for help.""14 At other times, "Wish to die" statements can be positively
manipulative, in order to gain attention, or to provoke or test the reaction
of others. 147 For some patients, expressing a desire to hasten death may
be "an extreme coping strategy for intrusive emotional and cognitive
experiences, often related to anticipated images of agony and suffering in
'
the dying process."148
Alternatively, it might represent simply "a dawning
recognition of what lies ahead rather than a request for hastened death. 149
A request for hastened death can be a way to express a wish to live, but
not in the current way.15 Sometimes, a patient might simply mean that
she is looking forward to dying, or hoping that it happens more quickly.
Expressing a wish to die might also be a "manifestation of letting go,"
and a way for the dying patient to let her loved ones know that she has
accepted that she is dying. At other times, or at the same time, it might be
an expression of despair, 15 1 and a device through which a patient can
"vent her fear" and "regain agency." 152
There is now considerable evidence that the wish to die is "dynamic
and interactive," and that patients expressing an interest in dying may be
'
experiencing "several thoughts and wishes concomitantly."153
Importantly,
as Ohnsorge et al explain, "wish to die" statements are "a vehicle" to
enable the patient "to speak about dying.1 15 4 Indeed, the desire to talk
about hastening death appears to be common among dying patients.155
There are studies that indicate that suicidal thoughts occur in nearly half
of all terminally ill patients,156 and in as many as a third of all residents
in long-term care facilities. 157 Most of the time, this is not because these
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patients have a concrete desire to access an assisted death, but this does not
mean that their wish to hasten death should be ignored. On the contrary,
Romayne Gallagher suggests that by "exploring what a patient means by
such statements and providing information and guidance to the patient,
'
physicians can help make the individual feel heard and supported."158
Patients therefore want to have their wish to hasten death listened to and
treated with respect, but this is not the same thing as treating it as if it were
a command to be acted upon. 159
One of the unintended consequences of the legal status of assisted
dying-whether it is unlawful or lawful only if certain criteria are met-is
that it will shape the way in which healthcare professionals and others
respond to a dying person's wish to talk about wanting to die. Where
assisted dying is illegal, if a person expresses an interest in hastening death,
a common response is: "I can't help you with that.""16 In their study of
patients who had expressed a desire to hasten death in Germany, Pestinger
et al explain that they were "deeply impressed that all patients claimed
that both health and family caregivers tended to ignore or deny their desire
' The conversation is shut down because opening it up would
to die."161
be
uncomfortable for the healthcare professional,162 as well as legally risky.
In the UK, the General Medical Council advises doctors that if patients
raise the issue of assisting suicide, while they should "be prepared to listen
and to discuss the reasons for the patient's request," they should "limit any
advice or information in response, to an explanation that it is a criminal
offence for anyone to encourage or assist a person to commit or attempt
suicide."163

Where assisted dying is legal, but only in certain circumstances, once
again, the response to a patient's interest in an earlier death might be to
say that she does not qualify, or to point her in the direction of someone
who can assist in determining whether she fulfils the eligibility criteria. As
a result of the limits to its legality, there will be restrictions upon what can
be discussed openly and legitimately.
As a result, yet another mismatch in debates over whether to legalize
assisted dying is that we focus upon the question of whether eligibility
criteria can be sufficiently robust and watertight in order to protect the
vulnerable, while missing the fact that we may be inadvertently adding to
158. Supra note 149.
159. Pestinger, supra note 92.
160. Ibid
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162. Claxton-Oldfield, supra note 155.
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the tendency to shut people up when they want to talk in an open-ended
way about wanting to die. This matters because there is evidence that
simply talking about end of life wishes, and in particular, about the desire
for euthanasia, "can bring peace of mind to a patient and that having the
'
conversation sometimes makes the subject less pressing."164
Indeed, as
Monforte-Royo et al explain, if the wish to hasten death is best understood
as a response to multidimensional suffering', what the patient may need
is more personalised care, rather than a response grounded in seeing their
wish to die as a request for assistance in dying.165
But while we might try to solve this problem by encouraging
healthcare professionals to engage in conversations about hastening death,
this is not without risks of its own, and where assisted dying is lawful,
creates a further dilemma. It is easy to see why it would be problematic
for healthcare professionals to raise the option of assisted death with their
patients. If a patient's doctor were to offer the option of an assisted death
now, or as a possibility for the future, this might look like endorsement or
even encouragement to consider assisted dying.166 A patient who otherwise
would not have contemplated an assisted death might be influenced by
their doctor's mere mention of assisted dying, which might be interpreted
as "a loss of hope or abandonment." 6 It is also possible that a patient
might prefer not to know that she meets the eligibility criteria for assisted
dying.168 If, however, assisted dying conversations are never initiated by
doctors, then it will be open only to those patients who are well informed
and confident enough to raise it with their doctors, and, as a result, it will
169
be an option only for the more privileged sections of society.
This intractable problem is reproduced in relation to organ donation
following assisted dying, which is an option in Belgium,"' and in the
Netherlands,' for patients who do not suffer from malignancy or other
contraindications to donation. If a doctor were to mention the possibility
that as a result of dying an assisted death, the patient could donate her organs
164. Suzanne J Booij et al, "A plea for end-of-life discussions with patients suffering from
Huntington's disease: the role of the physician" (2013) 39 J Medical Ethics 621.
165. Cristina Monforte-Royo, Josep Porta Sales & Albert Balaguer, "The wish to hasten death:
Reflections from practice and research" (2016) 23 Nursing Ethics 587.
166. Of course, this may also be an issue when doctors mention the option of refusing other lifeprolonging treatments, like dialysis or cardio-pulmonary resuscitation.
167. Mara Buchbinder, "Aid-in-dying laws and the physician's duty to inform" (2017) J Medical
Ethics DOI: <10.1136/medethics-2016-103936.
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and thereby save others' lives, this might look like a strongly persuasive
endorsement of an assisted death. Swarte et al are also concerned that
the patient might "get the impression that the physician is only willing to
perform euthanasia because the patient will donate organs" (emphasis in
original).172 Yet at the same time, if doctors do not mention the possibility
of organ donation, out of concern that this might influence the patient's
choice, someone who would have benefitted from the knowledge that her
organs might be able to help others after her death will not be able to do so,
unless she has acquired this information independently, which once again
is likely to be the case only for the relatively privileged.
There is not an obvious solution to the problem of whether to be open
or not with patients about the options of assisted dying and organ donation.
But what is clear is that openness to talking about dying in general, and
about the desire for death, is associated with better outcomes, for patients
and for the relatives and friends that they leave behind.173 Any legal
provisions which make open conversations about death more difficult, and
hence less likely to happen, are working against the interests of dying
patients.
V. Improving care at the end of life
Jonathan Herring has persuasively argued that there is a further mismatch
between the volume of academic scholarship devoted to the question of
assisted dying, which, even when it is lawful, is relevant to a relatively small
number of people, and the comparative lack of interest in a numerically
much more pressing issue, namely the inadequate social care available to
vulnerable and elderly patients:
While we debate the rights and wrongs of assisted dying, older people
are dying in poverty, freezing temperatures, and desperate hunger. So
many are neglected by their communities, abandoned by their families,
living isolated, socially excluded lives. For many, their last months or,
if they unlucky, years are spent in care homes marked by abuse, neglect,
and over-medication.'74

In addition to being intrinsically worthwhile, improving the standard of
care available to older people might also help to address the fear of the
dying process which prompts some requests for assisted dying. Given
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media reports of inadequate care and neglect,"' 5 and many people's
personal experiences of watching someone they love die on a general ward
in hospital, or in ajoyless nursing home, it is not surprising that a common
reaction to a devastating diagnosis is profound and debilitating fear of
what lies ahead.
The UK's review of the Liverpool Care Pathway, which had been
a laudable attempt to ensure that patients dying in hospital were able to
benefit from best practice in palliative care found not, as the Daily Mail
and the Daily Telegraph had suggested, that the Liverpool Care Pathway
(LCP) was being used to euthanase vulnerable patients."' Rather, although
there had been instances of straightforwardly poor care, more commonly
families were upset at the way in which their loved ones had died, often
because there had been inadequate communication about their imminent
deaths, and what to expect."'7 In one acute trust, "new doctors had an
induction into the LCP that lasted only an hour. This involved no practical
17 8
training and it was easy to miss. Nor was it compulsory.
I do not mean to suggest that we should give up on attempts to devise
a safe and publicly acceptable scheme for the legalization of assisted
dying, just because legalization might carry the risk of unintended
consequences. On the contrary, the unintended consequences of illegality,
such as the increased incidence of suicide among those with new and
frightening diagnoses, are more alarming than the series of mismatches
I have described above. Rather, my point is that the legalization agenda
should be pursued at the same time as a drive towards better and more
dignified care for patients towards the end of their lives, 17 9 which might
in turn assuage some of the fears people have about what will happen to
them before they die. We should also make sure that a primary goal of any
legal regime is that it facilitates the open discussion of death and dying,
including enabling those who are nearing the end of their lives to be able
to talk frankly about their desire to hasten death.
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